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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1. Integrity in public life is an essential component in establishing trust between citizens 
and their governments.  However, over recent decades there has been increasing 
concern worldwide that standards of integrity are in decline.  In part, that concern 
reflects a parallel focus on corruption as a core threat to good governance.  The two 
concepts – corruption and integrity – are thus often understood as two sides of the 
same coin, an increase in one leading to a decline in the other.   
2. In practice, much of the attention devoted to integrity has been largely implicit: rather 
than exploring in depth what should be understood by integrity in public life, and how 
to achieve it, researchers, activists and policy-makers have too often seemed to 
assume that integrity will result from the elimination of corruption.  Their focus has 
therefore overwhelmingly been on tackling corruption, rather than on promoting 
integrity. 
3. To focus primarily on corruption inevitably places emphasis on the negative 
behaviours we are seeking to prevent as opposed to the positive behaviours we wish 
to encourage.  Integrity means more than just ‘not corrupt’, and involves doing the 
right thing in the right way. 
4. Lack of clarity about what integrity is has hindered attempts to promote it.  In 
particular, the relationship between personal integrity and role-based integrity, as well 
as between integrity at the individual or at the institutional level, has resulted in 
confusion about the how the concept can be translated into practical action. 
5. Integrity thus entails complex relationships with other dimensions, and can be 
analysed from various perspectives.  For the purpose of developing an approach to 
integrity management (that is, the formal framework to ensure ethical behaviour by 
public officials), the report distinguishes core characteristics of personal and political 
integrity.  The former entails: wholeness (thinking beyond just the personal); action 
that is consistent with principles (doing the right things); morality (doing things for 
the right reasons); and process (doing things in the right way).  The latter 
encompasses: normative justice; openness and transparency; citizen engagement; and 
impartial authorities. 
6. Predominant anti-corruption approaches respond to a logic that does not sit easily 
with the promotion of integrity.  The reason is that policies designed to combat 
corruption are usually developed as a reaction or response to particular scandals, or 
else are designed to prevent specific behaviours.  They are driven by an attempt to 
address the visible expression of corruption, focusing primarily on institutional 
configurations or regulatory frameworks, rather than the promotion of a pro-integrity 
mind-set amongst public officials. 
7. The report therefore addresses the issue of integrity management, focusing on what 
the OECD (2009) has referred to as an implementation deficit, as well as on the 
relationship between compliance-based and values-based approaches to ensuring high 
standards in public administration.  The reports pays particular attention to the issues 
of culture and leadership in promoting appropriate models of integrity.   
8. The report is informed by fieldwork that was undertaken in Bolivia and Rwanda, as 
well as by desk-based research on relevant primary and secondary sources. 
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Introduction 
 
Integrity in public life is an essential component in establishing trust between citizens and 
their governments.  However, over recent decades there has been increasing concern 
worldwide that standards of integrity are in decline.  In part, that concern reflects a parallel 
focus on corruption as a core threat to good governance.  The two concepts – corruption 
and integrity – are thus often understood as two sides of the same coin, an increase in one 
leading to a decline in the other.  Yet, in practice, much of the attention devoted to integrity 
has been largely implicit: rather than exploring in depth what should be understood by 
integrity in public life, and how to achieve it, researchers, activists and policy-makers have 
too often seemed to assume that integrity will result from the elimination of corruption.  
Their focus has therefore overwhelmingly been on tackling corruption, rather than on 
promoting integrity.  However, to focus primarily on corruption inevitably places emphasis 
on the negative behaviours we are seeking to prevent as opposed to the positive behaviours 
we wish to encourage (Heywood and Rose 2015: 102).     
 
Many understandings of corruption see it as being a deviation from an ideal state – most 
often expressed through the analogy of illness (usually, cancer) – and suggest that its 
eradication will restore affairs to their proper purpose.  Hence: cure corruption and integrity 
results.  In fact, though, ensuring that public officials do not behave corruptly does not 
guarantee that they will instead act with integrity.  It is quite possible to act non-corruptly, 
but also without integrity – for instance, by performing a task with little effort, habitually 
turning up late to work, refusing to cover for colleagues, and so forth.  However, whilst the 
absence of corruption does not imply the presence of integrity, it is not so obvious that the 
reverse holds: if public officials are acting with integrity, they generally cannot – by most 
understandings of the definition of the term – be acting corruptly. 
 
This report explores the seeming paradox of this one-directional correspondence in more 
detail.  It sets out from the observation that we need a better conceptual understanding of 
integrity in public life and its relationship to corruption to build an effective model of 
integrity management – that is, the formal framework that ensures public officials engage in 
ethical behaviour, acting with honesty and fairness whilst complying with prevailing legal 
norms.  A key argument is that predominant anti-corruption approaches respond to a logic 
that does not sit easily with the promotion of integrity.  The reason for that is that policies 
designed to combat corruption are usually developed as a reaction or response to particular 
scandals, or else are designed to prevent specific behaviours.  They are driven by an attempt 
to address the visible expression of corruption, focusing primarily on institutional 
configurations or regulatory frameworks, rather than the promotion of a pro-integrity mind-
set amongst public officials. 
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It is also true, however, that the promotion of integrity faces core challenges, amongst them 
the difficulty of defining what we mean by the term – compounded by its overlap not just 
with anti-corruption, but also with ethics, morality and good governance.  Equally, practical 
questions about how best to implement pro-integrity policies, or integrity management, 
have received relatively little attention in comparison to the focus on anti-corruption.  This 
report sets out from the basis that this imbalance needs to be addressed as a matter of 
urgency if the growing distrust between the public and the political class evident in many 
jurisdictions across the world is to be reversed. 
 
The report is structured as follows.  In the first part, we examine the concept of integrity to 
show how it can be defined in such a way as to inform its practical implementation in public 
life.  We distinguish integrity from related ideas that focus on anti-corruption and good 
governance, and address issues such as how to identify different types of integrity, how to 
measure its extent and depth, and how to address competing conceptualisations at 
different scales of operation (individual, organisational, regional, national and so forth).  The 
second part of the report addresses the issue of integrity management, focusing on what 
the OECD (2009) referred to as an implementation deficit, as well as on the relationship 
between compliance-based and values-based approaches to ensuring high standards in 
public administration.  We pay particular attention to the issues of culture and leadership in 
promoting appropriate models of integrity.  The report is informed by fieldwork that was 
undertaken in Bolivia and Rwanda, which are covered in more detail in other papers. 
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Part 1: Defining Integrity 
 
What Integrity is Not… 
 
In a political context, the notion of integrity is often referred to in parallel with seemingly 
similar concepts, such as quality of government, good governance, or anti-corruption.  
However, whilst there are overlaps between them, integrity entails additional elements that 
go beyond these more widely-used terms.  In line with William Connolly’s observation that 
to elucidate a concept involves unpacking its complex connections with other concepts to 
which it is related, we seek in this section to disentangle integrity from these alternative 
notions.  Our approach reflects the belief that, in politics, ‘language is not a neutral medium 
that conveys ideas independently formed; it is an institutionalized structure of meanings 
that channel political thought and action in certain directions’ (Connolly 1983: 1). 
 
Over recent decades, one key characteristic of approaches to measuring the quality of 
government has been a focus on control of corruption, and the extent to which jurisdictions 
have designed and implemented effective anti-corruption policies (QoG 2010).  In turn, by 
effective anti-corruption policies, what is generally meant is evidence of institutional and 
legal enforcement provisions.  According to the World Bank (2004, cited in Andersson and 
Heywood 2009: 751), ‘corruption prevails where there is ample opportunity for corruption 
at little cost’, a viewpoint similar to Klitgaard’s (1988: 75) famous dictum that corruption 
equals monopoly power plus discretion minus accountability (C=M+D–A).  Such an 
understanding, reflecting rational-choice models of incentive driven behaviour, has been 
highly influential in anti-corruption approaches.  By this logic, anti-corruption measures 
should increase the expected cost of corrupt behaviour by raising the risk of being caught 
and ensuring that punishment is sufficiently severe to act as a deterrent. 
 
However, evidence demonstrates that responses to incentives are less predictable than 
such models assume and, at best, rationality is bounded (Jones 1999). Faced with the same 
set of incentives in any given context, different individuals may respond in different ways, 
reflecting the complex interplay of personal motivations and situational factors that 
influences behaviour.  Despite this, it is widely assumed in many approaches to anti-
corruption that the problem to be addressed is effectively just rent-seeking (generally, 
bribery), with its consequent impact on economic efficiency.  Thus, alongside unrealistic 
assumptions about motivation, there is a tendency towards a reductionist view of what 
corruption entails. 
 
Arguably, both these characteristics have been driven in large measure by a focus on the 
economic consequences of corruption.  Indeed, the growth of international concern about 
corruption over the last twenty-five years has largely reflected worries about its financial 
costs to business, rather than about the exploitation of the most vulnerable or poorest in 
society.  Accordingly, much of the work on corruption has set out from attempts to measure 
or quantify its extent.  Whilst it is clearly essential to have an idea of the scale of any 
problem that we seek to address, the manner in which predominant corruption measures 
have been developed has entailed efforts to reduce the complexity of the phenomenon to 
numerical indicators, narrowing its meaning to what the numbers indicate.  Such an 
approach ignores more abstract aspects of the issue of corruption such as its political, social 
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and ethical dimensions, as well as ignoring contestation over its very meaning (Erkkila and 
Piironen 2009: 126).  Indeed, the quantification of corruption has effectively encouraged a 
de-politicisation of the topic, with dominant approaches to anti-corruption constructing it as 
a technical, institutional design issue. 
 
Such an understanding of corruption/anti-corruption has had two consequences.  First, it 
has promoted a tendency towards ‘isomorphic mimicry’ (Pritchett, et al. 2010) in the shape 
of technocratic measures to combat corruption wherever it occurs, offering broadly uniform 
strategies with little consideration for specific or local contexts.  However, as we explore in 
more detail in this report, there can be marked divergences between generic and local 
understandings of corruption (Heywood and Johnson 2017).  The second, related, 
consequence is that these standard approaches to combating corruption focus primarily on 
addressing its direct manifestations rather than its underlying causes.  Although corruption 
is almost universally seen as wrong and undesirable (Rose and Peiffer 2015; Rothstein and 
Torsello 2014), in those parts of the world where its existence is endemic, corrupt practices 
can still be socially accepted as a norm (Walton 2014).  Indeed, corruption can be both 
condemned in principle and accepted in practice, so we need to explore the circumstances 
under which citizens may tolerate the existence of corrupt activities (Peiffer and Marquette 
2016).  In turn, that means digging deeper into the values and beliefs that determine social 
attitudes towards corruption, for even if institutional reforms and technocratic 
interventions can help bring about short-term changes in overtly corrupt activities, lasting 
change requires more fundamental changes in values. 
 
One potential way of addressing this need for deeper-rooted change is to focus on 
promoting integrity rather than on directly combating corruption.  This places emphasis on 
the positive pole of public ethics rather than its negative pole, and addresses the issue that 
not being corrupt does not automatically translate into behaving with integrity.  Moreover, 
if social perceptions of and responses to corruption reflect the way it is understood and 
interpreted in any given context, then we need a better understanding of the values and 
meanings that underpin such responses.  Because integrity has a core focus on values and 
ethical principles, this can help balance the tendency in anti-corruption approaches to pay 
attention to the rules framework and governance structures as opposed to underpinning 
motivations that shape behaviour (Heywood and Rose 2016).  Moreover, an integrity 
approach encompasses not just the actions of public officials, but also the wider network of 
trust relationships between government and citizens, institutions and clients, as well as 
public and private sector actors. 
 
 
Integrity and Quality of Government 
  
Quality of government (QoG), like integrity, is a difficult concept to define.  It generally 
encompasses a range of dimensions, including the absence of corruption, the presence of 
the rule of law, the depth of democracy and the efficiency of government.  However, there 
is debate over whether the focus should be solely on matters of process, or whether it 
should also include policy content.  If policy content forms part of the analysis, this runs the 
inevitable risk of partisan judgements over what constitutes ‘good’ or ‘correct’ policy, as 
well as the likelihood that ethnocentric bias will influence assessments.  Whilst this latter 
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risk is also present in procedurally based approaches, there are none the less safer grounds 
on which to assess whether processes – as opposed to policies – meet a given standard 
(Dahl 1989). 
 
Rothstein defines quality of government as impartial public administration, that is ‘having 
impartial government institutions for the exercise of public power’ (2013: 6).  According to 
Rothstein and Teorell (2008: 170), impartiality means that ‘when implementing laws and 
policies, government officials shall not take anything about the citizen or case into 
consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law’.  This definition 
meets three core conditions, in Rothstein’s view.  First, it is based on a core value or basic 
norm, reflecting in this case Rawls’ right-based theory of justice and its principle of equal 
human worth.  Second, it shifts focus from the ‘input’ side (who wins elections, who decides 
policies, who votes for what) to the ‘output’ side, since ‘impartiality is … first and foremost 
an attribute of the actions taken by civil servants, professional corps in public service, law 
enforcement personnel, and the like’ (Rothstein 2013: 28).  That is, impartiality cannot 
constitute a moral demand in relation to the content of policies, but must instead be 
exercised in the implementation of policies: for example, a policy to favour the appointment 
of women to correct gender imbalance in a given sphere would not be impartial in its 
content, but should be implemented impartially, meaning that all female applicants should 
be treated equally in the selection process.  Third, impartiality implies universalism, in that it 
represents a basic norm that should be applicable to any institutional system, rather than to 
a specific one. 
 
The focus on impartiality as the core principle of quality of government has several 
elements in common with the concept of integrity.  For example, they both have a 
normative character, they both refer to policy implementation, and they both have 
universal applicability.  However, there are also some key differences, most notably that the 
idea of integrity implies the need to go beyond just policy implementation.  As pointed out 
by Agnafors (2013: 434-6), the version of impartiality proposed by Rothstein and Teorell 
runs the risk of being reduced to strictly following rules, regardless of what those rules are.  
Their response, that QoG as impartiality must be conducive to morally preferred outcomes 
(to avoid the charge that impartial extremist regimes could score high on their definition) 
remains problematic, since it implies that such outcomes should be a criterion of their 
definition – and that undermines the insistence on focusing on just the output side, since it 
would mean we need to identify the content that is conducive to such preferred outcomes 
(Aganfors 2013: 436). 
 
At a more prosaic level, the focus on procedure rather than policy content would allow for a 
situation in which a government that is fiercely committed to fighting corruption seeks to 
prosecute anyone about whom there is any suspicion, but pays scant regard to human rights 
in doing so.  If all presumed corrupt individuals were treated in the same way, this would 
meet the criterion of impartiality, but would hardly be compatible with any claim by that 
government to be acting with integrity.  Alternatively, as outlined by Aganfors (2013: 426): 
  
Consider two modes of governances, G1 and G2, each aiming at the same values and 
outcomes and both being identical on the input side. G1 strictly follows the norm of 
impartiality and achieves outcome 0, meaning that under G1 the people are on the 
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brink of starvation, despite no unusual circumstances burdening the state in 
question. However, had the government and its officials been more flexible and 
taken other values into account, outcome 0 might have been avoided. In such a case, 
it seems odd to say that G1 is an instance of ideal QoG. G2, in contrast, slightly 
deviates from impartiality and achieves outcome 1 in the same circumstances, 
meaning that the people under G2 prosper to an unprecedented degree. It seems to 
me that G2 is more deserving of the label QoG than G1, ceteris paribus, despite G2’s 
deviation from the ideal of impartiality. 
 
Thus, acting with integrity entails more than just applying rules equally to all, without regard 
for the particular circumstances pertaining to any given individual; indeed, the notion of 
integrity implies what might be termed ‘the principle of policy complementarity’.  By policy 
complementarity, we mean that the implementation of policy, and the effects thereof, 
should be consistent with a broader normative principle of ethical government that takes 
into account the moral status of the laws and policies in question.   
 
 
 
What Integrity Is… 
 
Integrity is like the weather:  
everybody talks about it but nobody knows what to do about it.  
(Carter, 1996) 
 
The concept of integrity has been analysed from a wide variety of perspectives.  Menzel 
(2005) offers a five-fold classification of the literature on ethics and integrity in governance, 
although he does not provide any explicit definition of integrity: ethical decision-making and 
moral development; ethical laws and regulatory agencies; organisational performance; 
ethics management; and the ethical environment.  Huberts (2014) dissects the literature by 
academic discipline, identifying works in public administration, philosophy, sociology and 
anthropology, criminology and law, psychology and neuroscience, economics and business 
administration, and political science.  Whereas some researchers focus on social and 
institutional contexts as key explanatory factors for integrity violations, others pay much 
more attention to individual motivations or moral attitudes as key drivers. 
 
 
This basic divide between structural and agency-focused approaches underlines the breadth 
of the concept, though in essence most definitions of integrity entail some sense of acting in 
accordance with accepted moral principles. However, even if this seemingly straightforward 
idea captures the essence of integrity, it gives rise to a host of questions: whose moral 
values; who decides; how are such decisions made; to whom do they apply; how do they 
change; and so forth.  Moreover, it raises questions about the difference between ethics 
and morals.  Dutelle (2012: 2-3) suggests that morality refers to customs or manners in a 
given socity and can therefore be different in different cultures, whereas ethics are constant 
and refer to an absolute standard of behaviour – although, in practice, the two terms are 
often used interchangeably. 
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Huberts (2014: 38ff), whilst defining integrity as the quality of acting in accordance with 
relevant moral values, norms and rules, draws a distinction between integrity and 
integritism – the latter defined as inappropriate integrity judgements ‘because the values or 
norms and not moral or are irrelevant for the subject studied’ (Huberts 2014: 39).  This 
sense of relevance also underpins the approach taken by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its 2009 report on establishing an integrity 
framework, in which integrity is defined as ‘the application of generally accepted values and 
norms in daily practice’ (OECD 2009: 9). Carter (1996) states that integrity goes beyond just 
honesty: it is about being willing to act openly and consciously in line with what you believe 
to be right as opposed to wrong based on moral reflection.  According to Benjamin (1990), 
the three core elements of integrity are a coherent and stable set of highly cherished values 
and principles, the public expression of the same, and conduct that is consistent with them. 
 
Naturally, as Huberts (2014: 52) observes, not all values and norms are relevant in 
discussions of moral judgements.  For example, views as to what counts as beautiful, 
conventional or effective are not germane to any definition of integrity; instead, the moral 
questions at stake are those that pertain to right or wrong, good or bad.  At issue here is 
how to reach agreement over such inherently normative assessments. 
 
Integrity is often seen as being related to values such as trustworthiness, consistency and 
reliability.  Montefiore (1999) defines a person of integrity as someone upon whose word it 
is possible to rely and who accepts the responsibility to answer for their actions.  Indeed, 
the values most closely associated with the notion of integrity are sincerity and honesty.  As 
Montefiore (1999) shows, however, it is possible to show sincerity without having integrity, 
since the latter requires consistency in behaviour.  Thus, an overt display of sincerity on a 
given issue would not necessarily reflect integrity unless the person in question always 
demonstrates such sincerity. 
 
If we apply such a reflection to the political realm and focus on the intrinsic need of political 
leaders in democratic societies to seek to persuade voters of the merits of their position, we 
can ask whether such a requirement for consistency applies in the same way.  Cox et al. 
(2003) agree that insincerity and hypocrisy are incompatible with integrity, but add that the 
expectation that politicians should always speak with perfect sincerity is misplaced.  Telling 
the truth is of course expected in politics, but that expectation should not be simplistic, 
since politicians can hardly speak without regard to their audience, the occasion, the 
potential impact of their speech, and how it will be interpreted by commentators or political 
opponents (Cox et al. 2003: 110).  Grant (1997) goes further when she argues that certain 
kinds of hypocrisy are a necessary feature of democratic politics because of the mutual 
vulnerability and dependence of voters and democratic politicians: accordingly, it is not 
feasible to imagine that a model of political integrity could exclude every form of insincere 
behaviour. 
 
The question, then, is where the line should be drawn to protect integrity in politics, since 
insincere behaviour clearly diminishes citizens’ sense of the trustworthiness and 
responsibility of the political class, also seen as crucial to integrity.  Cox et al. (2003: 11) go 
back to the issue of relevance: ‘a certain insincerity of speech is not by itself a defeater of 
integrity, but the telling of avoidable lies about important matters of public concern 
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certainly is’.  To understand what counts as avoidable, we need to think of possible 
scenarios in which political promises may be modified because of circumstances beyond the 
control of political actors.  Of course, it is recognised that political circumstances can change 
and it may be unavoidable to tailor or modify commitments or promises in relation to such 
changes. 
 
For instance, if political leaders promised not to raise taxes when they were elected, but 
then reluctantly decided to do so when faced some time later with a global economic crisis 
that was having a major impact on the country, it would be harsh to judge them as being 
insincere.  However, if those same promises were made solely to secure victory in the 
election, with no intention of following through once in power, then clearly such actions 
would lack integrity.   
 
The key, then, lies in the original intention when making a political promise – something 
that may not be straightforward or even possible for outside observers to deduce.  None 
the less, the distinction allows us to differentiate in a political sense between making 
promises with integrity and acting with integrity.  The former entails being sincere, not 
engaging in self-deception and being serious in intent (Cox et al. 2003); the latter means 
seeking to do one’s best to fulfil promises unless and until forced to alter them by force 
majeure.  In similar vein, Kaiser and Hogan (2010) argue that integrity is not so much about 
following the rules in any rigid sense, but rather in ensuring ‘fair play’ within the rules.  It is 
conceivable that on occasion following rules could harm others, and in that circumstance, 
acting with integrity would require setting the rules aside.  Ultimately, the views outlined so 
far indicate that assessments of integrity in politics tend to focus on the behaviour of 
individual actors, who are expected to ‘live’ the values they espouse by being fully 
committed to them. 
 
It is clear that being authentic and true to oneself are widely seen as a key element of acting 
with integrity.  However, this raises the dilemma of how to reconcile a clash between 
personal beliefs and the requirements of an official role – as demonstrated in the case of 
Sally Yates, the acting US Attorney General who in January 2017 issued an instruction to 
justice department lawyers not to enforce President Trump’s Executive Order on ‘Protecting 
the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States’.  On the one hand, her 
refusal to support the Executive Order could be seen as acting with integrity, in the sense of 
being true to her belief that it was potentially unconstitutional; on the other, it could be 
seen as acting without integrity in that her role as acting Attorney General should have 
obliged her to enforce an ostensibly legal order.  That there is no simple answer to this 
question is highlighted in McFall’s insistence that integrity can only be demonstrated by 
people who have commitments that a reasonable person would accept as important, and 
therefore potentially subject to constraint: ‘personal integrity requires that an agent 
subscribe to some consistent set of principles or commitments and, in the face of 
temptation or challenge, uphold these principles or commitments, for what the agent takes 
to be the right reasons’ (McFall 1987: 9).  To the extent that Yates was acting in manner 
consistent with her principles or commitments, she could be said to be displaying integrity – 
but there will be inevitable dispute over whether she did so for ‘the right reasons’.   
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Thus, integrity is inextricably connected to moral conceptions of the good.  McFall draws a 
distinction between personal integrity and moral integrity, suggesting that it is possible to 
have the former without the latter, proposing as an example a lover of literature who is 
prepared to stop people burning books by killing them: ‘Although we may find his actions 
morally abhorrent, we may still be inclined to grant him the virtue of personal integrity.  We 
would not, however, hold him up as a paragon of moral integrity’ (McFall 1987: 14).  This 
example underlines that personal integrity, as such, may not always be compatible with 
broader considerations – and that further complicates the relationship between the idea of 
integrity and its practical application to those who hold public office.  If we view integrity in 
terms of ‘identity-conferring commitments’ – that is, the fundamental essence of what 
drives us – then upholding these may clash with moral principles understood in terms of 
impartiality and universality.  According to McFall (1987: 16), ‘if moral integrity presupposes 
personal integrity, and personal integrity requires identity-conferring commitments, then 
moral integrity is, generally, inconsistent with impartiality’.  Indeed, McFall’s argument 
highlights that neither personal nor moral integrity cannot exist in a vacuum, unconnected 
to the wider social setting in which someone lives.  To that extent, therefore, integrity is 
necessarily a relational concept. 
 
Kaiser and Hogan (2010: 217) argue that ‘like beauty, integrity is in the eyes of the 
beholder’.  Huberts (2014: 45) proposed a similar idea when he states ‘one cannot be the 
judge of one’s own integrity’.  Instead, it is wider public or the community directly affected 
by an individual’s behaviour that makes such judgements.  The reason, according to 
Huberts, is that morality and ethics ‘concern values and norms that people feel rather 
strongly about because serious interests are involved that affect the community they are 
part of’ (2014: 50).  Heywood and Rose (2015: 113) have argued that ‘an action taken by a 
public official that a significant majority of people think is morally wrong is not an action 
taken with integrity’.  
 
These arguments suggest that judgements on whether actions are undertaken with integrity 
are context dependent, since they will be influenced by public attitudes at any given time.  
In turn, however, this also requires further elaboration, since it is not clear how public 
attitudes should be assessed when opinion is sharply divided over an issue – as, for instance, 
on matters such as abortion, or capital punishment.  Equally, is it only the public within a 
given jurisdiction that counts in terms of judgements over moral principles?  If there was 
clear majority support for what outsiders might consider morally offensive (for instance, use 
of the death penalty in politically motivated anti-corruption campaigns), would the 
implementation of such a policy allow a government to claim it was acting with integrity? 
 
From a philosophical perspective, Calhoun (1995) sees integrity as not just an individual, but 
also a social virtue, since it requires that citizens should understand their role as being part 
of a wider evaluative community.  Being part of a community implies having regard to the 
deliberative judgements of others, and so acting with integrity means considering the 
potential impact of any decision on the wider interests of the community (Calhoun 1995: 
257).  A person of integrity, in this view, is aware that their own judgements serve a 
common purpose and therefore a lack of integrity reflects an inability to understand that 
need to assess the views of others. 
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Other disciplinary perspectives, such as organisation ethics, also stress the link between 
integrity and the existence of community.  Brown (2005) shares Calhoun’s emphasis and 
talks of ‘relational awareness’, defined as ‘a consciousness of the relations in which one 
participates’ (Brown 2005: 6).  So, consistency does not suffice as an essential element of 
integrity; indeed, remaining consistent without appreciation of the wider community can 
actually stand in the way of integrity.  In Brown’s terms, ‘the relational self exists prior to, 
and serves as the foundation for, expressions of the individual self’ (Brown 2005: 5). 
 
These reflections by Calhoun and Brown on the social character of integrity apply more to 
the process of decision-making than to the content of decisions themselves.  Hubert (2014: 
51) emphasises a similar idea when he argues that integrity in government is not about 
policy content, but rather about the behaviour of the participants in decision-making and 
the subsequent implementation (in terms of processes and procedures) of the outcomes.  
Thus, as the ideas elaborated so far clearly show, the concept of integrity is far from 
straightforward even in a conceptual sense, and requires careful unpacking if it is to inform 
policy formulation (see Grebe and Woermann 2011). 
 
 
Conceptualising the operation of integrity in practice 
 
A focus on integrity, at least at a rhetorical level, is not a new development.  For instance, 
the US-based NGO, Global Integrity, has been publishing data for over a decade in the form 
of country reports with scorecards that cover the functioning of key institutions, and 
formerly produced Global Integrity Reports (2006-13).  Transparency International 
developed a National Integrity System (NIS) assessment approach that focuses on the key 
pillars in a country’s governance system, ‘both in terms of their internal corruption risks and 
their contribution to fighting corruption in society at large’ (TI 2017).  The NIS reports, that 
now number around 70 in total, provide valuable and detailed information on the individual 
countries.  However, they have also been criticised for having a narrowly institutional focus, 
a lack of cultural sensitivity, poor conceptualisation of the notion of integrity, and an 
emphasis on compliance-based approaches to combating corruption (Grebe and Woermann 
2011; Heywood and Johnson 2017).  We focus in more detail in what follows on the NIS 
approach, as well as the Seven Principles of Public Life (the so-called ‘Nolan Principles’) 
established by the UK government in 1995, and the Community Integrity Building approach 
developed by the NGO, Integrity Action. 
 
 
• Transparency International’s National Integrity System (NIS) assessments 
 
NIS assessment reports focus mainly on the legal tools and institutional structures that 
prevent corruption in a given country.  According to TI (2017), the NIS offers ‘a 
comprehensive means of assessing a country’s anti-corruption efficacy sector by sector.  
It allows a nuanced analysis of national efforts to stamp out corruption’.  The integrity 
system is conceptualised in the NIS approach as a collection of ‘pillars’ representing 
institutional and political elements ‘both in terms of their internal corruption risks and 
their contribution to fighting corruption in society at large’ (TI 2017).  The model takes 
the form of a Greek temple with thirteen pillars, representing the core components of a 
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country’s governance system: legislature, executive, judiciary, public sector, law 
enforcement, electoral management body, ombudsman, audit institutions, anti-
corruption agencies, political parties, media, civil society and business.   
 
Underpinning the temple, its foundations comprise public awareness and society’s 
values: ‘if public awareness is high and values are strong, both will support the ‘pillars’ 
which rest on them, giving them added strength.  On the other hand, if the public is 
apathetic and not watchful, or if the values are widely lacking, then the foundations will 
be weak.  The ‘pillars’ will be empty and ineffectual, and lack the underpinning 
necessary if they are to safeguard the nation’s integrity’ (Pope 2000: 36).  On top of the 
temple roof, three balls represent the principles of sustainable development, rule of law, 
and quality of life, with the idea being that the roof should remain level to prevent these 
balls rolling off.  
 
NIS assessments examine both the formal framework of each institution and their actual 
performance.  They are based on the belief that the evaluation of the different 
components must be addressed in a holistic manner (Pope 2000), and that to keep 
corruption in check, all the pillars should function well.  Indeed, if the pillars are not of 
similar heights, the structural resilience of the temple will be compromised – although 
the NIS approach does allow for some pillars to compensate for, or support, others.  
None the less, the ideal is that the quality of the integrity system is best ensured 
through completeness, with all pillars present and functioning properly.  The NIS 
approach thus has a strongly institutional focus, based on the idea that when 
governance institutions ‘function properly, they constitute a healthy and robust National 
Integrity System.  However, when these institutions are characterised by a lack of 
appropriate regulations and by unaccountable behaviour, corruption is likely to thrive, 
with negative ripple effects for the societal goals of equitable growth, sustainable 
development and societal cohesion’ (TI 2017). 
 
The temple metaphor has been widely criticised, notably its emphasis on pillars 
(Heywood and Johnson 2017).  Not only is it unlikely that all pillars would be able to 
reach the maximum height, even in low corruption jurisdictions, but their separation 
underplays the extent to which a national integrity system relies on interaction between 
different elements and components.  To reflect this, scholars in Australia have suggested 
an alternative metaphor of a bird’s nest, in that it does not depend upon any individual 
stick, but a well made nest will be structurally strong. The absence of any individual stick 
can often be compensated for by other sticks, in the same way that poor functioning in 
some public institutions can potentially be compensated for by above average 
performance among other institutions. If the goal of NIS assessments is to diagnose 
problems and provide policy makers with potential solutions, then understanding the 
interrelationships between institutions may be just as important as understanding the 
functioning of individual components (Sampford et al., 2005: 104; see also Six and 
Lawton, 2013: 640). 
 
The NIS model was developed specifically with the idea of universal applicability, 
allowing for an assessment of how a country performs against some ideal standard.  
Consequently, it has been criticised for exhibiting a western bias that favours more 
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industrialised countries that have a longer history of democratic functioning.  Indeed, 
some have argued that the NIS approach does not make sufficient allowance for 
contextual specificity and, in particular, the nature of the political settlement and froms 
of political contestation within a given jurisdiction (Heywood and Johnson 2017). 
 
• The Seven Principles of Public Life in the United Kingdom 
 
Ever since the reforms that ended so-called ‘old corruption’ in the United Kingdom in 
the late 19th century, the country has often been seen as offering an example of high 
levels of integrity in public life.  However, a series of scandals in the late 1980s and early 
1990s prompted a renewed focus on the issue, resulting in the creation in 1994 of the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL), an advisory non-departmental body, to 
focus on ethical standards amongst holders of public office.  In the Committee’s first 
report, published in 1995, it set out the ‘Seven Principles of Public Life’, also known as 
the Nolan Principles after the name of its first chairperson, Lord Patrick Nolan.  The 
seven principles are: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, 
honesty, and leadership.  They have become established as a guiding framework for all 
public institutions and activities in the UK. 
 
The CSPL defines integrity as follows: ‘holders of public office must avoid placing 
themselves under any obligation to people or organisations that might try 
inappropriately to influence them in their work.  They should not act or take decisions in 
order to gain financial or other material benefit for themselves, their family or their 
friends.  They must declare and resolve any interests and relationships’ (CSPL 1995).  It is 
notable that this definition focuses primarily on what to avoid doing, but says little that 
offers a proactive guide to positive behaviour, apart from declaring conflicts of interest.  
Indeed, this is reinforced through the imperative and normative language used, which 
recalls the compliance-based approach discussed above.  It also stands in contrast to the 
overall tone favoured by the CSPL, that has favoured a values-based approach: ‘the 
“Nolan principles” were designed to work within the traditions of the public sector 
ethos, in part because statute had rarely been a favoured option to establish ethical 
standards’ (Heywood 2012: 481).  The contrast between the aims and the language used 
suggests that the CSPL understanding of integrity is limited to what is not right, rather 
than what is the right thing to do or the right way to behave. 
 
 
• Integrity Action’s Community Integrity Building 
 
The goal of Integrity Action, a UK-based organisation, is to help tackle corruption by 
building integrity in some of the world’s most challenging environments.  A key plank of 
the approach is Community Integrity Building (CIB) that seeks to strengthen 
accountability and guarantee that citizens are better prepared to deal with corruption 
challenges, advocate for better services, and reduce waste in public funding (Integrity 
Action 2017).   
 
Integrity Action sees integrity as requiring the alignment of four factors: accountability, 
competence, ethics, and corruption control.  Accountability is defined as the ability of 
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stakeholders to check that promises are fulfilled, as well as responsiveness to legitimate 
internal and external demands.  Competence is the ability to do something well, which 
means having and deploying the skills and capabilities required to achieve personal or 
organisational goals.  Ethical behaviour is defined as behaving in accordance with 
principles and commitments established to guide decision-making, as well as being 
aware of what is legally, morally, or professionally obligatory or permissible.  Finally, 
corruption control means zero tolerance towards corruption and ensuring that an 
organisation has a framework in place to reduce the risk of corruption taking place. 
 
The definition of integrity provided by Integrity Action seeks to be concrete and 
reasonably measurable, as expressed in the formula: I = a (A, C, E) - c, where  Integrity (I) 
= the alignment (a) of Accountability (A)/Competence (C)/and Ethical behaviour (E), 
without corruption (c).  However, the notion of competence in this context is potentially 
problematic.  Whereas some measure of competence is necessary to have integrity, and 
some measure of integrity is necessary to do a job well, simply having the capacity to 
achieve a certain standard is insufficient to ensure it happens (Cox et al. 2003).  Whereas 
one person may be competent to perform a task properly, but lacks motivation or desire 
to do so, and another may lack the necessary skills but tries to make up for that through 
determination and effort, neither would be acting with integrity.  Equally, an assessment 
of competence is often derived from results, but it may be the case that the poor 
outcome of a task has nothing to do with lack of capacity or integrity, but is instead 
driven by factors beyond an individual’s control that make it look like they lack 
competence.   
 
The three conceptualisations outlined above provide different perspectives on how to 
assess integrity in practice.  What they have in common is that integrity is not presented as 
a goal to be achieved, nor as a positive way to promote ethical behaviour.  Instead, they 
present integrity in terms of its negative pole, laying stress on what should not be done, 
rather than outlining what the positive characteristics of integrity entail, and the reasons 
why such characteristics are important.  To that extent, there is insufficient attention paid in 
these accounts to the issue of motivation: the reasons that underpin the positive 
dimensions of integrity as a guide to action. 
 
 
The core elements of integrity 
 
- Wholeness: consistency and cohesion 
 
Etymologically, the word ‘integrity’ derives from the Latin integer, which means ‘intact’ or ‘a 
thing complete in itself’.  Standard dictionary definitions see integrity as the state of being 
whole or entire, and ‘to integrate’ means to bring together, combine or incorporate into a 
whole or a larger unit.  Thus, a core characteristic of integrity is wholeness, involving the 
union between different parts, and its opposite would be separation and division. 
 
Wholeness can operate either internally or externally.  In the literature on integrity, the 
internal focus relates to individuals demonstrating consistency, coherence and a 
correspondence between thought and action.  This is achieved when there is alignment 
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between a person’s views and their behaviour over time and in different settings 
(Musschenga 2014, cited in Huberts 2014).  External wholeness refers to how elements 
relate to each other to achieve unity.  Integrity is more than just the relationship between 
the parts that make up the whole; it is also about having the ‘right relationship’, highlighting 
the normative dimension of integrity.  Brown (2005) identifies some characteristics that can 
help ensure the ‘right relationship’: relational awareness when interacting with others; 
inclusion, to ensure openness to difference and disagreements; and pursuing a worthwhile 
purpose whilst ensuring consistency between conduct and the wider institutional aims. 
 
Being part of a larger network of interactions requires social awareness and sensitivity to 
social issues (Kapstein and Wempe 2002), civic cooperation (Brown 2005) and social 
responsibility.  In a political context, wholeness operates at different levels: in institutional 
terms, for instance, it requires all public officials to be guided by the same institutional goals 
and mission, ensuring cohesion and unity.  In terms of a national government, integrity in 
the sense of wholeness requires coherence between the political discourse about the 
administration’s vision or goals and the specific policies it implements.  Thus, a government 
that promises more equitable welfare policies, but introduces tax cuts for the richest and 
reduces social expenditure would not be acting with integrity. 
 
 
- Action: more than just intention 
 
Integrity requires consistency between thought and action.  As outlined by Montefiore 
(1999), this means that an individual’s desires and working principles are fully integrated; 
the individual is not in conflict with him/herself; the individual does not engage in 
unexpected departures from his/her normal pattern of conduct.  By the same token, 
integrity is undermined by fragmentation and by a failure to ensure that values and 
commitments are aligned (Cox et al. 2003).   
 
Although some authors lay stress on consistency and alignment as the core elements of 
acting with integrity (Montefiore 1999; Calhoun 1995), others insist that integrity can only 
be exercised in the face of addressing conflicts or difficult decisions (Cox et al. 2003; McFall 
1987).  According to this latter view, integrity is less about the commitment to particular 
values and principles than about how individuals behave when placed in situations that 
challenge them.  Whereas the first position suggests a less dynamic sense of what integrity 
entails and reduces the space for ambivalence, the second position suggests the need to 
test the strength or reality of claims to act with integrity.  In essence, these two positions 
reflect opposing poles or certainty and self-doubt. 
 
 
- Morality: working for the public interest 
 
Consistency between what one says and what one does is a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for behaviour to have integrity in anything other than the narrowest sense of 
being true to oneself at a personal level, as outlined by McFall (1987).  However, in a 
political sense, acting with integrity implies in addition that behaviour should be consistent 
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with ethical principles and morality.  According to Cox et al. (2003), the content of one’s 
commitments, values and desires is as important as their translation into agency. 
 
For some, this moral dimension to integrity when applied to a political setting means the 
pursuit of the public interest and the common good.  Appleby (1952) says that when actions 
are disconnected from the public good, society becomes morally corrupt.  Public officials 
thus have a responsibility to prevent this by ensuring they remain committed to acting in a 
moral and socially ethical manner.  In turn, that means having continuous regard to the 
public interest and the overall needs of the community rather than the interests of any 
individual or private interests. 
 
In the literature, integrity and ethics are often used interchangeably, but the two can be 
distinguished.  Ethics operates more at the level of values or beliefs, whereas integrity 
requires some form of practical manifestation of those ethical values.  In the words of 
Huberts (2014: 51), ‘the ethics of governance focuses on the moral values and norms that 
apply to decision-making and implementation, and integrity points to the actual behaviour 
of the actors involved in the policy process and whether that behaviour is in accordance 
with the relevant moral values and norms’.  Thus, someone could be described as having 
ethical principles and beliefs, but they can only be said to have integrity if those are 
reflected in their actual behaviour.  For this reason, codes of ethics for public officials do not 
suffice to ensure integrity – and prioritising ethics over integrity risks focusing on intention 
rather than action. 
 
 
- Process: design and implementation 
 
Integrity is expressed in process rather than outcome, since the moral and ethical 
commitments that lie behind any given action cannot guarantee the intended results.  
Moreover, it is in the process of acting that opportunities arise for reflection and adaptation 
to changing circumstances, allowing for the realisation of confronting challenge that some 
see as essential to the definition of acting with integrity (Cox et al. 2003). 
 
In political science literature, there has been much focus on outputs, particularly whether 
specific policies have achieved what they set out to.  However, the process by which policies 
are developed and implemented is also a critical element in assessing whether governance 
is functioning appropriately, particularly in a democracy (Rose and Heywood 2013: 148-9). 
 
Thus, for political action properly to be described as having integrity, it should manifest 
wholeness in the sense of coherence between proper aims and means to achieve them, 
with morality underpinning the actions undertaken and the process through which they are 
implemented. 
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Key debates on integrity in practice 
 
As we have seen, integrity is not a straightforward or uncontested concept.  Accordingly, 
there are several ongoing debates about integrity and its application to political contexts 
that need to be considered, focusing especially on: degrees of integrity, the universality of 
its scope, where it properly resides, and whether it can be measured. 
 
- Degrees of integrity: is integrity a binary concept? 
 
For some, integrity is something you either have or do not.  The Dutch Minister of the 
Interior, Ien Dales, gave a widely-cited speech in 1992 in which she stated, ‘A little bit of 
integrity is not possible’, prompting a focus on the whole issue of integrity management in 
The Netherlands (Hagedoorn and Hermus 2016: 33).  For others, a ‘little bit of integrity’ is 
indeed possible, and – given any set of norms and values – human behaviour can range 
from exemplary, through acceptable, deviant and unacceptable.  Huberts (2014: 57) argues 
that integrity can denote different things at different social levels or in different moral 
spheres, meaning – for instance – that a person can act in an exemplary way at work, but 
behave very differently in their private life.  How much integrity a person has depends on 
the moral expectations of the relevant public that is equipped to judge, and the public may 
change its view over time. 
 
Equally, there is a question of whether a single act that is out of character by someone who 
otherwise behaves fully in accord with expectations undermines their claim to integrity 
(Marquette 2015).  If such a slip can be forgiven in someone who would normally act with 
integrity, is it also the case that someone with lesser standards of behaviour can sometimes 
act with integrity in a given situation.  This suggests that when we are dealing with specific 
actions, it is possible to talk of degrees of integrity, but when we are assessing whether a 
person can be defined as ‘having integrity’, consistency of behaviour is more important. 
 
 
- Is the concept of integrity universal? 
 
The public administration literature on global ethics and the universality of values (Ghere 
2005; Widdows 2011) raises questions that are also relevant to the concept of integrity: to 
what extent can integrity be exported, or does it need to be developed locally?  This is of 
particular relevance to questions of good governance and anti-corruption, where tensions 
between universalistic and relativistic understandings are well-established.  Some argue 
that the fact that some societies appear more tolerant towards corruption than others 
raises the question of whether what is deemed to be corrupt varies from country to 
country.  Might understandings of integrity also be context-dependent? 
 
 
- Types of integrity: individual and institutional 
 
It follows from the discussion so far that integrity can operate at different levels, including 
personal, professional and institutional.  A public official could act with integrity even if the 
department they are employed by has no code of ethics.  Although integrity is often seen as 
an attribute of individuals, institutions can play a key role in promoting integrity.  They can 
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help redirect individuals to focus on the public good, as well as provide an appropriate 
context and conditions to enable people to work with integrity.  If public officials work in 
settings with codes of conduct, codes of ethics, effective human resources support and so 
forth, they are more likely to be able to show integrity in exercising their duties.  Grebe and 
Woermann (2011) argue that the integrity of institutions (that is, institutions that are 
coherent and perceived as legitimate) results directly from congruence between the codes, 
norms and rules of an institution and the behaviour of individuals who work within it.  
Moreover, they underline the importance of the nature or type of institution being 
appropriate to the task it is designed to perform, identifying this as a third level of integrity 
alongside individual and institutional performance. 
 
 
- Can integrity be measured? 
 
There have been various attempts to measure quality of governance, levels of corruption 
and related ideas.  There is also a very extensive literature on the problems and pitfalls of 
measurement, particularly in relation to corruption.  These have generally focused on the 
difficulties – both conceptual and methodological – involved in any attempt to measure 
what are essentially normative concepts, and they relate primarily to a mismatch between 
concepts and their measurement, an over-reliance on proxy indicators, and western-
focused elite bias (Bukovansky 2015; Heywood 2015; Heywood and Rose 2014).  As we have 
already seen, existing approaches to conceptualise integrity in relation to governance have 
often seen it as a residual of anti-corruption: when corruption is absent, integrity will be 
left.  Equally, we have seen that most prevailing approaches to anti-corruption have had a 
strongly institutional focus.  Accordingly, it is hardly a surprise that those measures of 
integrity that do exist exhibit a similar institutional bias, as outlined above when discussing 
Transparency International’s National Integrity System assessments. 
 
One of the most recent approaches to measuring integrity exhibits both of these 
characteristics.  The Index of Public Integrity (http://integrity-index.org), developed by 
Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov, specifically measures a country’s capacity to control 
corruption by focusing on six individual and, it is suggested, actionable components: judicial 
independence, administrative burden, trade openness, budget transparency, e-citizenship, 
and freedom of the press.  The overall aim of focusing on these six dimensions is to reduce 
opportunities and increase constraints, but the Index lacks any specific elaboration of what 
is understood by integrity.  Instead, it is quite overtly focused on corruption: ‘The Index of 
Public Integrity (…) assesses a society’s capacity to control corruption and ensure that public 
resources are spent without corrupt practices’ (http://integrity-index.org).   As with much of 
the literature on integrity in public life, the term here stands as a proxy for the control of 
corruption and, as such, overlooks the complex challenges of identifying what exactly 
integrity entails.   
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Part 2: Integrity Management 
 
Integrity management refers to the formal framework that ensures public officials engage in 
ethical behaviour, acting with honesty and fairness whilst complying with prevailing legal 
norms (Behnke and Maesschalck 2016).  Such a framework needs to combine law 
enforcement and motivation in an appropriate system of rules, values, guidelines and 
socialisation mechanisms (Heywood 2012: 486).   
 
Since the 1980s, there has been widespread tendency to adopt New Public Management 
(NPM) reforms in public administration, aimed at introducing managerial techniques to 
enhance the quality and efficiency of public services.  As Hood (2001: 12553) explains: 
 
‘Its focus on public service production functions and operational issues contrasted 
with the focus on public accountability, ‘model employer’ public service values, ‘due 
process,’ and what happens inside public organizations in conventional public 
administration. That meant New Public Management doctrines tended to be 
opposed to egalitarian ideas of managing without managers, juridical doctrines of 
rigidly rule-bound administration and doctrines of self-government by public-service 
professionals like teachers and doctors.’ 
 
NPM as both a term and an approach has been highly controversial, but it has often been 
associated in the literature with an increased focus on results-driven, managerialist ethos 
that undermines autonomy and responsibility amongst public officials.  However, one 
alleged pathology of NPM is that it has led to a greater, rather than reduced, focus on ‘rules-
based, process-driven’ bureaucracy with an emphasis on compliance rather than results 
(Hood 2001). 
 
If NPM has come to be associated with compliance, with a focus on regulations and 
procedures, an alternative approach has emphasised the importance of integrity, with a 
focus on values and ethics.  Whilst in practice integrity management inevitably entails a 
combination of compliance and values, the core challenge is to find the right combination 
for any given jurisdicition to support effective and accountable government. 
 
Compounding that challenge is what has been referred to as an implementation deficit, 
meaning that despite general agreement on the need to ensure integrity and ethics are at 
the heart of government, insufficient attention has been paid to making it happen.  The lack 
of a clear operational definition of integrity, a superficial understanding of how to embed it 
in practice, and the absence of political will are among the key obstacles that need to be 
overcome. 
 
In this section of the report, we explore in more detail the relationship between 
compliance-based and values-based approaches to integrity management, tracing the 
evolution from ‘Old Public Administration’ to ‘New Public Management’ and ‘New Public 
Service’.  We outline what an integrity-focused model of public administration entails, and 
address the issue of the implementation deficit, laying emphasis on the role of institutional 
culture and of leadership. 
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Towards a public integrity management model 
 
New Pubic Management (NPM) has its intellectual roots in managerialism, institutional 
economics and rational or public choice models.  One of its central tenets is that public 
sector efficiency and success depend on the quality and professionalism of managers 
(Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 20).  The emphasis is on policy implementation rather than 
design, moving from traditional ‘public administation’ to what is termed ‘public 
management’ (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003), with a primary focus on productivity and 
performance.  Such an approach has been strongly associated with privatisation of state 
assests and contracting-out of public services, in the belief that these will enhance both 
efficiency and effectiveness (Kolthoff, Huberts and Van Den Heuvel 2007).  In the NPM 
conception, citizens operate as customers and consumers of public agencies, and their 
relationship with those agencies parallels that of transactions in a market place. 
 
The NPM approach was developed as an alternative to so-called Old Public Administration 
(OPA), a default model that built upon on the ideas of Max Weber that had been originally 
introduced in the United Kingdom and Prussia in the late 19th century (UNDP 2015: 5).  OPA 
shares with NPM the aspiration to achieve efficiency, utilising some core business principles, 
but is managed in a different way.  Under OPA, the optimum means to achieve efficiency is 
through hierarchical organisation with managers exercising control from the top and 
expecting public officials to act with neutrality and professionalism, enacting without demur 
the directives that come their way (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 12).  This contrasts with 
the NPM approach, which sees managerial control exercised most effectively through the 
use of incentives.  Under OPA, there is a clear separation between politics and 
administration, with appointed officials held to be accountable to their political principals, 
and only via them to the public (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 7).  Officials and the public 
thus have little direct involvement in policy design, which is properly the remit of elected 
politicians. 
 
As with NPM, the intellectual foundations of OPA owed much to public choice theorists, 
notably Herbert Simon’s classic Adminstrative Behavior (1957) that equated rationality with 
efficiency and argued that the most rational behaviour is whatever enables an organisation 
to achieve its goals in an effective way.  The premise underlying this view of rational 
behaviour is a positivistic view of scientific knowledge, in which validity depends on being 
able to demonstrate that a proposition is either true or false – thereby placing a premium 
upon efficiency rather than values in any discussion of organised action (Simon 1957). 
 
The idea of running government more like a business already had its origins in OPA, but 
NPM approaches have entailed more than just the application of market mechanisms and 
techniques in government.  NPM also shifted thinking about the role of public officials, the 
nature of their profession, and their purpose (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 13).  According 
to some, this shift in thinking also led to a refocusing of the values that had traditionally 
characterised the public sector, moving from an emphasis on service towards the 
prioritisation of efficiency and effectiveness.  In addition, NPM saw greater focus placed on 
rules and regulations over ethical values.  Denhardt and Denhardt (2003: 28-9) identify 
substantial conceptual differences between OPA and NPM (see Table below). 
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 Old Public 
Administration 
New Public 
Management 
New Public 
Service 
Integrity Model 
Public interest Politically 
defined and 
expressed in law 
Aggregation of 
individual 
interests 
Dialogue about 
shared values 
Defined by shared 
values and mission  
Public officials Clients and 
constituents 
Costumers Citizens Co-responsible 
citizens 
Government 
role 
Rowing 
(designing and 
implementing 
policies focused 
on single 
political defined 
objectives) 
Steering (acting 
as a catalyst to 
unleash market 
forces) 
Serving 
(negotiating and 
brokering 
interests among 
citizens creating 
shared values) 
Awakening 
commitment to the 
public interest by 
citizens and public 
officials 
Individual 
motivation 
Pay and 
benefits, civil 
service 
protections 
Entrepreneurial 
spirit; 
ideological 
desire to reduce 
the government 
Public service; 
desire to 
contribute to 
society 
Desire to fulfill their 
role as empowered 
people to achieve a 
better society 
 
* Table based on and amplified from Denhardt & Denhardt, Table 1 in The New Public Service. 
Serving, not Steering (2003: 28-29).  
 
The widespread adoption of NPM approaches from the 1980s onwards has stimulated a 
debate over the relative virtues of compliance-based and values-based approaches to 
integrity management (discussed in more detail in the next section), and has also sparked 
questions about the allocation of power within public administration and the responsibility 
of public institutions towards citizens.  The NPM approach places administrators at the helm 
of the ship of state, overseeing the goals, direction and strategy of public institutions.  By 
doing so, this increases the risk of forgetting who owns the ship (Denhardt and Denhardt 
2003: 23); indeed, some proponents of NPM seem to overlook the fact that governments 
operate on behalf of citizens (King and Stivers 1998) and that the role of public officials 
should be to serve citizens, as well as to build public institutions characterised by integrity 
and responsiveness (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 23). 
 
In response to concerns about the potential pathologies of NPM approaches, an alternative 
model known as New Public Service (NPS) – associated principally with Denhardt and 
Denhardt (2000) – has been proposed.  NPS places public service, democratic governance 
and civic engagement at the heart of what public administration is about: governments 
should be responsive to citizens, whose rights and obligations are enshrined by law, and 
should protect their capacity to influence political decisions (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 
27).  Calling into question the idea of judging public administration solely on the basis of 
efficiency, NPS emphasises other factors , such as equality, equity and responsiveness 
(Frederickson 1980).  Service should be the main purpose of public officials, focusing on the 
needs of citizens rather than on exercising control and authority. Thus, public officials 
should contribute to building a collective and shared notion of the public interest, placing 
primary value on people, not just productivity (Denhardt and Denhardt 2003: 42-3). 
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This drive towards a more values-based approach in public administration, promoting 
integrity and ethical principles, has been gaining ground in recent years.  As outlined in the 
OECD Report, Towards a Sound Integrity Framework: Instruments, Processes, Structures and 
Conditions for Implementation (OECD 2009), 
 
‘Public sector integrity management – often called ethics management – has been 
high on the agenda in many OECD countries for over a decade now.  Underlying this 
evolution is a growing understanding that integrity is a keystone of good 
governance, a condition for all other activities of government not only to be 
legitimate and trusted, but also to be effective’. 
 
The global impact of corruption in its various forms, alongside the disappointing results of 
anti-corruption policies based on institutional reform and law enforcement, has emphasised 
the need for a new public administration paradigm.  A claimed strength of NPS is that its 
values-focused approach reclaims the importance of a sense of service, and also role of 
citizens as responsible co-participants in society’s functioning and well-being.  NPS is also 
concerned with instilling appropriate values and commitment in public officials, laying 
emphasis on integrity by addressing intentional and motivational behaviour and focusing on 
the causes of issues rather than just their impact or resolution.   
 
 
Compliance- and values-based approaches: Seeking the right balance 
 
New Public Management reforms were introduced largely through applying new rules and 
regulations, paying little attention to the issue of public officials’ own view of their ethical 
commitments to the public good (Storlazzi 2009: 184; Van Deth and Scarborough 2003; 
Heywood and Rose 2015). The emphasis on compliance with these rules reflected a belief 
that ‘integrity is ensured when behaviour is maximally regulated, regardless of the 
intentions of those holding office’ (Heywood and Rose 2015: 110). 
 
However, there has emerged a growing debate about both the relative merits, and the 
appropriate relationship, between such regulatory, compliance-based approaches to 
integrity management and those that focus on values (Huberts et al. 2008; Heywood 2012; 
Chapman 1998).  Where compliance-based approaches reflect a belief that people do things 
because they are required to, values-based approaches assert that the appropriate 
motivation for behaviour is the desire to do the right thing (Foster Back 2006: 8).  
Compliance stresses procedures, following rules and monitoring systems to detect 
violations; a values-focus stresses ethics, moral awareness training, ethical codes and the 
importance of leadership setting positive examples.  Compliance implies regulation and 
punishment of poor behaviour, whereas values-based approaches focuses on preventing 
the behaviour taking place.  [See box, below] 
 
It is evident that compliance and values should not be seen in crude either-or terms: both 
are necessary in any system of public integrity management, and the critical issue is to 
identify the appropriate balance between them in any given jurisdictional setting.  A recent 
study conducted in The Netherlands, where there has been extensive focus on this issue, 
looked at the effectiveness of different integrity instruments at the local government level 
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(Huberts et al. 2014).  It found both that rules and codes are considered very effective, and 
also that training about moral awareness and/or acting with integrity – provided by only half 
the municipalities – was similarly deemed very effective (Huberts et al. 2014: 177).  The 
authors suggest that it is the interaction of policies to promote integrity and to fight 
corruption that provides the most effective approach to integrity management (Huberts et 
al. 2014: 179). 
 
Such a conclusion inevitably raises the question of what that interaction, or relationship, 
should look like in practice.  There are five key variables that need to be taken into account 
when seeking to identify an effective approach to integrity management: context; timing 
and sequencing; diversity; mutual reinforcement; partnership. 
 
• Context: Adaptation to the particular context is of course critically important.  In 
a situation where different forms of corruption are deeply embedded in virtually 
all levels of public administration, it would be naïve to expect that an emphasis on 
promoting ethical values through an emphasis on integrity will have much 
purchase.  In such cases, the priority may need to be on enforcing respect for the 
most basic standards of behaviour, and compliance-based approaches are the 
only ones that would have any chance of having any short-term impact.  Equally, 
however, where public officials are trustworthy, compliance strategies may risk 
generating more unethical behaviour than they solve.  As we have seen, the 
response to corruption scandals has increasingly been to implement new 
regulations and legal requirement.  However, such responses run the risk of 
creating an us-vs.-them attitude among groups of officials whose work is stripped 
of an ethical discourse, which in turn can create the space for conflicts of interest 
between group loyalties and obligations to the law. 
Indeed, the nature of the political settlement in any given jurisdiction will have a 
profound impact on what kinds of reform are even possible: where informal 
governance and networks are the norm, meaning that authorities are able to by-
pass the formal structures of decision-making and accountability, it may be that 
there are more fundamental issues that need to be addressed before the integrity 
of public officials can even be considered.  Thus, any attempt to find an 
appropriate balance between compliance and values will be conditioned by the 
political context, which will delimit the range of possible options. 
• Timing/sequencing: Following on from the issue of context, in situations where 
corruption is deep-rooted, it may be that a first stage of reforms requires the 
imposition and application of tough laws in order to generate a sense that 
malfeasance will not be tolerated, before it is possible to focus more directly on 
integrity-building initiatives.  Our research on Bolivia offered just such an 
example.  In the city of La Paz, the mayor Juan del Granado (1999-2010) 
introduced a zero-tolerance approach to corruption when he first assumed office.  
This approach was so comprehensive and so strict that it was only semi-jokingly 
described by Pedro Susz, a key Del Granado aide, as a ‘policy of terror’ in which 
the administration would ‘shoot first and ask questions later’ (Zúñiga and 
Heywood 2015).  The new administration vowed to take action against the 
slightest hint of corruption, although always in line with due legal process.  
However, this draconian persecution of corruption was just the prelude to a much 
more comprehensive programme of reforms designed to reshape the relationship 
between the public institutions of La Paz and its citizens, based on establishing 
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greater transparency, improving service delivery and creating mechanisms for 
participation designed to build trust (Zúñiga and Heywood 2015).   
It was clear from the Bolivian example that, to have credibility, action needed to 
be taken by Del Granado immediately upon assuming office.  Any delay in 
addressing the issue of corruption would have allowed doubts to become 
established about his commitment.  Equally, he needed to take hardline action 
against corruption first, before focusing on building ethical values and integrity 
amongst public officials, in order to root out bad practices that had become 
established and the people responsible for maintaining them.  Only then could he 
set about building new ways of working, based on an ethical commitment to 
promoting integrity. 
• Diversity: the implementation of any system of integrity management needs to 
take into account the diverse range of likely responses amongst public officials.  
Research suggests that when presented with a code of public ethics, for instance, 
some officials will follow it immediately because they believe in and want to live 
by the principles espoused; others will accept the importance of the principles, 
but their readiness to adopt them will be influenced by other factors (including 
their personal circumstances, pressure from above, the general moral climate in 
the workplace); a third group will seek to prioritise short-term rewards even at 
the expense of engaging in actions they know to be wrong (see Cox et al. 2003).  
Whilst compliance measures may be appropriate for this third group, the risk is 
that such measures may alienate the first group. 
Another dimension of diversity relates to mechanisms of communication to wider 
audiences than just public officials.  Our research in Rwanda provided a good 
example of how the government has placed emphasis on instilling education 
about values as part of its national rebuilding process following the genocide of 
1994, using both formal and informal strategies.  The formal mechanisms include 
changes to the school curriculum, with lessons on anti-corruption and crime, 
gender issues, as well as culture and values.  At the national level, radio shows 
are used to support the overall message, and public institutions hold ‘anti-
corruption weeks’ to educate Rwandan citizens about the negative consequences 
of corruption.  Of particular importance are itorero, a pre-colonial style training 
camp where participants spend several weeks learning Rwandan history, pre-
colonial values and national policies, as well as issues of direct relevance to their 
particular profession.  Interviews we conducted with citizens who had attended 
itorero suggested that the main lessons they drew from them related to 
patriotism, integrity, heroism, leadership, commitment, dignity, self-esteem, 
creativity, entrepreneurship, rights and how to live with others.  Supporting these 
various initiatives are poster campaigns, visible throughout the country, with key 
messages about Rwandan values and taboos. 
• Mutual reinforcement: A society’s rules and values need to reinforce each other.  
If rules are introduced to address concerns about corruption, these should be 
consistent with public understanding of appropriate and acceptable behaviour – 
so, for instance, in settings where local chiefs or leaders are expected to be 
providers, it may be counterproductive to impose rules that restrict their capacity 
to disburse favours without alternatives in place.  Likewise, efforts to tackle 
corruption and promote integrity need to be integrated into wider initiatives to 
deliver effective services. 
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The Rwandan example offers an example of the importance of coherence and 
consistency, using appropriate resources to reach the whole population.  This stands 
in marked contrast to the Bolivian case, where we found education efforts at the 
national level to be sporadic and isolated, such as occasional anti-corruption 
caravans that are aimed at reaching the younger generation through fun-based 
activities and games, but that are insufficiently supported by other interventions. 
• Partnership:  It is important for there to be a sense of partnership between 
authorities and citizens working together towards shared goals.  Citizens should 
believe in the good faith of authorities to implement promised reforms, which 
requires both transparency and that effective accountability measures to be in 
place.  Compliance-based and values-based initiatives need to complement each 
other in terms of supporting the overall government message, and it is 
particularly damaging if public authorities profess a commitment to a specific kind 
of behaviour but are perceived to act in a manner that contradicts it – as 
arguably happened with the Conservative administration in the UK under John 
Major in the early 1990s and led to the establishment of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life (see Section 1). 
However, the experience of La Paz in Bolivia suggests that even when such 
mechanisms are in place, citizens may be reluctant to use them. According to a 
report published by the La Paz City Government in 2013, about 70 percent of 
respondents were unaware of citizen engagement initiatives.  That the mayor, 
Juan Del Granado, was still able to effective reforms that contributed to a change 
in the perception of public officials in the city strongly suggests that, whilst 
consistency and partnership are important, a key factor is strong and committed 
leadership. 
 
BOX 
 
Compliance-based and values-based approaches to the problem of corruption: one problem, different 
logics 
In order to show the different logics that characterize a compliance-based approach and a values-based 
approach, we outline the core elements of each ideal type below.  
Corruption according to the compliance model 
Causes: At the macro level there are conditions such as failures in the political system (lack of party 
competition and transparency, voter turnout), the size of the public sector, relationship between the public 
sector and business, complex regulation of market entry and tariffs, and increasing strength of organized 
crime. At the meso level, the causes of corruption have more to do with organizational structure, including 
work distribution, the gap between top management and the work floor, lack of control and supervision and 
mismanagement, lack of transparency, specific policies and rules, and lack of rationalization in public service 
related to traditional authority, patrimonialism, nepotism and cronyism. At the micro level, individual 
backgrounds and motives as well as individual economic circumstances are considered to be factors that might 
explain corrupt behavior within the civil service. 
  
The compliance model places explanatory weight for individual behavior on the context and structure.  
Individuals are conceived as rational actors whose behavior is determined by cost-benefit calculations. Hence, 
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a person will commit acts of corruption when the benefits of doing it are bigger than the potential negative 
consequences. Therefore, the solution to curb corruption is to change the context in a way that the incentives 
for corruption are reduced and the penalties for it are increased.  
 
Consequences: The compliance model focuses on the economic costs of corruption through distorting incentives, 
its political costs through undermining institutions, and its social costs through redistributing wealth and 
power towards the undeserving. 
 
Solutions: Institutional reforms and regulations in order to close down the space in the system for illicit 
activities. The formula is to reduce monopoly of power, limit and clarify discretion, reduce incentives for 
corrupt behavior, and increase accountability and transparency. That involves increasing penalties, raising the 
probability of being caught, and linking pay to performance, among other measures. Under this model, the 
target of the reform would be to stop individuals from committing corrupt actions.  
 
In terms of leadership, some of the causes of corruption such as lack of control or supervision, and lack of 
rationalization related to traditional authority, patrimonialism, nepotism and cronyism, points to a certain 
type of leadership along the lines of what is known as administrative leadership. In other words, a 
depoliticized leadership focused on managerial activities, which fits in the new public management style in the 
public sector. 
 
 
Corruption according to the values model 
 
Causes: At the macro level, these relate to the values and norms of the society and also the education system. 
At the meso level, the causes of corruption are found in the work culture and the values and norms of 
individual politicians and public officials. Leadership becomes an important element for the promotion of 
corruption, particularly the lack of commitment of leaders to public integrity, role modeling and the 
trustworthiness. In work cultures, lack of mutual trust and ethical beliefs are especially relevant. At the 
individual level, emotions, dominant and strong personalities, employee moral judgment, and lack of rational 
decision-making can lead to corrupt behavior.  
 
Consequences: A pro-values model considers the consequences of corruption in terms of how the misbehavior of 
leaders sets the tone. It also acknowledges the separation between citizens and public institutions and the 
political class created by a broken trust aggravated by corrupt behavior. From this perspective, corruption 
reduces the sense of belonging to and protection from the state, prompting individualistic attitudes. Likewise a 
values model pays attention to the effects of corruption in the way it is perceived when it is systematic and it is 
‘normalized’ or considered even as a solution to get what the state is unable to provide.  
 
Solutions: Efforts directed to the reinforcement of ethical values and the promotion of integrity, the redefinition 
of the relationship between institutions and public officials promoting a sense of belonging, safety and the 
identification with the institution’s mission and values, and a strategy to restore trust between citizens and 
government. A values-based approach will not intervene only at the level of the manifestations of behavior, 
but also at the level of the intentions and underlying beliefs that justify that behavior. Under this model, the 
target of the reform would be to promote an ethical, values-based attitude. 
 
The model also entails intervening at the structural level to create ‘institutions of integrity’ and ‘the integrity 
of institutions’ as part of a ‘developmental integrity model’.  The idea of ‘institutions of integrity’ refers to the 
institutionalized norms and codes of behavior. Integrity of institutions refers to whether they function 
correctly, are robust and legitimate and are fit for purpose. Structural conditions affect individual behavior just 
as individual behavior affects the evolution of the institutions. The preservation of integrity will depend on the 
congruence of both the institution and the individuals – that is, the alignment of the expectations and actions 
of the actors within the institution. 
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Systematic leadership is required, where leaders leader do not direct but instead guide the process via 
continuous and complex dialogue and interaction within institutions. Leaders attend to emergent institutional 
themes, and work for the preservation of the normative congruence. They are accountable not only for the 
outcome but for the people.     
 
 
 
Values in the public versus the private sector: complementary or conflicting? 
The introduction of practices drawn primarily from the private sector into the management 
and organisation of public administration has generated concern about their impact on 
questions of public integrity.  That concern revolves largely around alleged differences in the 
intrinsic values that characterise the private and the public sectors (Van der Wal et al. 2006).  
Some have argued that private sector values are fundamentally contrary to those of the 
public sector: for instance, Bellone and Goerl (1992) argue that entrepreneurial 
management values autonomy, personal vision, secrecy and risk-taking, whereas 
administrative values include democratic accountability, participation and openness.  The 
shift in values that has accompanied the move from more traditional public service 
management practices to a greater emphasis on efficiency and effectiveness carries with it 
certain corruption risks (Huberts and De Graad 2014: 155). 
However, empirical evidence does not offer any clear-cut support for the view that private 
sector practices in public administration lead to more integrity violations.  Indeed, after 
comparing the organisational values of workers in the public and private sectors in The 
Netherlands, Van Der Wal et al. (2008) found no support for the hypothesis that any decline 
in traditional public sector values was taking place as a result of adopting more business-
oriented approaches.  Moreover, Kolthoff (2007) found in his analysis of Dutch police force 
data that some core elements of NPM, such as performance measurement and business-
style management, helped to reduce the number of integrity violations such as corruption, 
fraud and theft.  These findings suggest that the impact on public integrity of NPM-style 
reforms may depend more on the way they are implemented than on the specific reforms 
themselves. 
Kolthoff et al. (2007) pose the question of whether the apparent opposition between public 
and private sector values actually reflects broader shifts in values more generally, whilst Van 
Der Wal (2009) suggests that the notion of public sector values should not be seen as fixed 
and unchanging over time.  Lyons et al. (2005), for instance, argue that younger employees 
in the public sector put less emphasis on altruism and universalism, and more on prestige 
and power.  Social values overall have evolved from an emphasis on tradition, respect for 
authority and concern with material well-being towards self-fulfilment, independence, and 
emancipation (Van Deth and Scarbrough 1998, 2003). 
Despite these broader societal shifts in values, the tendency in public sector management 
has been towards the imposition of top-down approaches characterised by an increase in 
rules and regulations.  The key concept that helps explain this seeming paradox is trust.  In 
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their study of the effectiveness of public service ethics in European Union member states, 
Demmke and Moilanen (2012: 1) show that the lower the level of public trust in a society, 
the greater the reliance on rules.  However, this raises the question of whether rules or 
ethical values are more effective in building trust (Foster Back 2006), and whilst it is often 
held that ethics are key, being loyal to institutional rules can itself be considered an ethical 
attitude. 
The literature on ethics in public administration distinguishes between two broadly 
opposing types (Thompson 1990; Adams and Balfour 2003; Finer 1941; Friedrich 1940).  The 
ethics of neutrality means that public officials behave according to the laws and principles 
within their organisation, whilst the ethics of individualism means that public officials act in 
accord with their own principles.  In the first case, the institution in question is ultimately 
responsible for decisions made in its name, whereas in the second case public officials are 
fully accountable for their own actions. 
Any approach to establishing an integrity management framework therefore needs to 
address potential ethical challenges in three areas: decision-making, organisational 
performance, and influences on behaviour.   
• On decision-making, the literature distinguishes between a deontological and a 
results-based approach (Lewis 2007), the first of these arguing that behaviour 
and actions are good or bad in and of themselves, whilst the second says that the 
ethical worth of decisions can be judged only in the light of their consequences.  
In turn, this highlights a further tension between collective and individual 
interests.  Whilst a disconnect between the two is often seen as an indication of 
corruption risks within an organisation, Lynch and Lynch raise the question of 
where responsibility lies for any such disconnect, suggesting that it is up to 
governments to support the judgement of public officials in a manner consistent 
with public accountability: ‘a government is moral in so far as it induces public 
servants to relate specific to the general, the private to the public, the precise 
interest to the inchoate moral judgement’ (Lynch and Lynch   2009: 11). 
 
Such an understanding places the onus on public officials to find a way of 
translating various private and special interests into a ‘public will’, becoming 
moral agents responsible for elevating the level of public discourse by explaining 
the value of public service to citizens (Lynch and Lynch 2009: 11; Garofalo and 
Gueras 2009: 69).  Through such an approach, collaboration between public 
officials and citizens is encouraged, helping to build bonds of trust that can help 
prevent corruption (Garofalo and Gueras 2009: 74). 
 
• In relation to organisational performance, one key challenge is how most 
effectively to educate public officials about ethics.  Rohr (2007) argues that 
ethical education should be practical, specific and operational in its objectives, 
but must also make allowance for new and evolving situations.  Whitton (2009) 
emphasises the need to move beyond simply having codes of ethics and ensuring 
that skills are taught in how to apply them in practice. 
 
Erakovich and Wyman (2009) outline two approaches to managing ethical 
compliance within organisations: enforcement through bureaucratic oversight and 
control, or measurement through accountability mechanisms.  Anechiarico 
(2007), in his comparative study of the anti-corruption experience of the USA and 
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The Netherlands, argued that the more controls there are in place, the less 
effective they become.   
 
• Amongst the key elements that determine or influence individual behaviour are: 
culture, leadership, emotions, political beliefs, rules and policies, perceptions, 
context, environment and values.  Erakovich and Wyman (2009) suggest that the 
interplay between these various factors is more important than any one of them 
in isolation, and that the way in which an organisation manages that interplay will 
be crucial in determining its overall performance in respect of integrity 
management. 
 
Integrity Management: The implementation deficit 
A number of studies have referred to an implementation deficit between the discourse 
around integrity and ethics in public office and its translation into practice (OECD 2009; 
Demmke and Moilanen 2012; Hoekstra 2016; Mulgan and Wanna 2011; Van Der Heuvel and 
Huberts 2003).  Whilst governments all around the world have increasingly been committing 
to policies on ethical behaviour, such policies are not being fully implemented.  Demmke 
and Moilanen (2012: 57) point out that ethical policies in the majority of European Union 
member states have been initiated as responses to scandals, with only The Netherlands 
adopting their approach on the basis of values-driven public discussions about ethics.  This 
suggests that, for most governments, their policies are driven primarily by instrumentalist 
concerns.  Equally, however, as we have seen in the preceding discussion, the difficulties of 
identifying how an integrity management policy should work in practice have also been an 
additional factor in the implementation deficit. 
 
However, perceptions of integrity are important if governments are to be able to claim 
credibility and trust, and so greater focus has been placed on implementation challenges in 
recent years.  Approaches to implementation can be broadly divided into formal and 
informal strategies.  A formal strategy entails the creation of explicit and visible structures, 
standards and systems to promote ethical values within organisations and institutions.  In 
such cases, integrity management tends to be centrally managed, with integrity identified as 
a measurable target to be achieved.  Implementation is managed by dedicated officials 
charged with ensuring adherence with the policy.  Informal strategies, by contrast, are 
implicit and seek to influence the ethical climate within institutions and society more 
generally.  Here, integrity is seen as an end in itself, and it mechanisms to promote it include 
such things as equitable remuneration policies, effective promotion structures, the 
promotion of shared values through leadership example, and recognition.  Such an 
approach is more decentralised than in formal strategies, and because it is more dependent 
on individual commitment and beliefs, it potentially makes integrity promotion more 
susceptible to subjective and ambiguous interpretations. 
 
Proponents of formal strategies argue that they allow for a more visible and sustained 
prioritisation of integrity, which is therefore less vulnerable to external turbulence, such as 
the global financial crisis (Hoekstra 2016).  Formal strategies are also seen as being more 
coherent and resistant to key implementation pitfalls, such as the over-reliance on a small 
number of committed individuals (Van Der Heuvel at al. 2010).  Critics, however, point to 
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the reputational risk if standards are not met and expectations not lived up to (Kaptein and 
Wempe 2002).  Equally, formal systems are seen as overly bureaucratic, imposing additional 
administrative burdens, and having officials charged with ensuring implementation might 
lead some to play down their own responsibilities in this area (Lawton et al. 2013; Van Der 
Heuvel and Huberts 2003).  Against these arguments, critics of the informal approach point 
to what they see as a naïve reliance on good intentions and conscience on the part of public 
officials, and argue that the lack of targets and measurable goals means that policy 
evaluation is more difficult. 
 
The OECD (2009: 58) states that, ‘however important prevention and guidance are, every 
integrity management framework will need a significant component of enforcement.  If the 
rules are clear for the staff members and the monitoring indicates transgressions of those 
rules, then sanctions will be necessary if the integrity management framework wants to 
maintain its overall legitimacy’.  This links back to questions about the relative merits of 
compliance-based versus values-based approaches to promoting integrity. 
 
 
Leadership and a culture of integrity 
 
Ultimately, whilst some form of combining values- and compliance-based measures is 
required in any system of integrity management, the key factor is the commitment of, and 
example set by, leadership.  Increasing attention has been paid in recent years to the 
importance of leadership, or ‘tone from the top’, in setting the right framework for integrity, 
both in the public and the private sector (Lamberton et al. 2005; Kayes et al. 2007).  Indeed, 
without appropriate signals from leadership, it is impossible to establish an integrity culture 
– that is, ‘the set of endorsed social understandings, behaviours and practices that affect 
how people think and act’ (Mulgan and Wanna 2011: 416).  Culture and institutional 
approaches are seen as playing different roles: ‘while institutions and rules provide the 
background context and can help to frame social action, it is the living-breathing culture 
that determines how they operate in practice and how people act in the many situations not 
covered by formal rules’ (Mulgan and Wanna 2011: 416). 
 
Institutional culture is sometimes defined in terms of the existence of formal tools, such as 
codes of conduct, or else policies such as openness, equal participation opportunities, and 
so forth.  Transparency and openness are the two attributes most frequently mentioned in 
regard to fighting corruption and promoting integrity.  Whilst codes of conduct are widely 
used to express the values that should prevail in an institution, the mere existence of such 
codes hardly ensures compliance; as one public official in La Paz, Bolivia, bluntly stated: 
‘codes of ethics do not work. What works is good practices, supervision, and ethical 
solidarity between colleagues’ (interview 5 Dec. 2014).  If by the culture of an institution, we 
understand those activities and behaviours that are taken for granted (Johnson 2001), this 
refers more to a sense that is felt rather than formally seen or explained.  Integrity is 
intimately connected to a sense of shared community (Brown 2005), reinforced by effective 
communication. 
 
Critically, communication refers both to what is said and what is not said within an 
institutional context, as well as who says it, how the message is spread, how the way it is 
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said sets expectations for how people should interact with each other, and how safe 
colleagues feel when they wish to ask questions or express views.  According to Brown 
(2005), the quality of patterns of communication (both verbal, as expressed in policy 
statements, mission statements, conversations, and non-verbal, through work design, daily 
schedules, practical skills) provide information that helps evaluate an organisation’s 
integrity.  Communication in this sense reflects lived patterns of practice, rather than formal 
codes or rules. 
 
A further aspect of effective communication to support integrity relates to appropriate 
consideration for others, recognising that colleagues are also private individuals, citizens, 
family members and that all these relationships will have a bearing on how a person 
behaves in the workplace (Brown 2005: 10).  Thus, communication should relate to the 
human aspect of institutional performance, and be consistent with the aims of the 
organisation as expressed both formally and informally. 
 
Leadership is therefore one the most critical factors for implementing an effective integrity 
management framework (Heres 2016, Lasthuizen 2008; Hassan et al. 2014).  Demmke and 
Moilanen (2012: 60) found that among EU member states, a lack of active leadership or 
leadership commitment was identified as the second most significant obstacle to 
implementing an effective ethics policy, behind a failure to take ethical policies seriously 
(which itself could be attributed to leadership failures).   Heres (2016: 165) states that 
‘ethical leadership is a key feature in building a strong ethical culture, and thereby 
preserving and strengthening the legitimacy, trust, and credibility needed for the 
governance of public institutions’.  Moreover, the increased complexity of contemporary 
societies demands more creative and responsive leadership, able to respond more rapidly 
than their institutions to change (Jackson and Parry 2008). 
 
Two of the main approaches identified in the literature are transactional and 
transformational leadership.  Transactional leadership is characterised by an exchange 
relationship between the leader and those under his/her charge, usually in the form of 
rewards for performance and compliance.  Transformational leadership refers to leaders 
who bring about change in attitudes, motivations and behaviours – reflecting the difference 
between leaders, who transform the institutions they head, and managers, who accept the 
institution as it is (Burns 1978; Rost 1998).  However, the direction of influence should not 
be seen as just one way: transformational leaders also reflect the influences of those in the 
workplace who are empowered to contribute to organisational development. 
 
In a recent study based on The Netherlands, Heres (2016: 173) identified five ideal-typical 
leadership traits:  
• the safe haven creator: establishes an environment in which it is safe to make 
mistakes and people can speak up; 
• the practising preacher: both models ethical behaviour and engages in dialogue, 
emphasising values and principles over rules and procedures;  
• the moral motivator: shows strong moral character and authenticity, but leaves it 
to those under their charge to decide what is morally appropriate behaviour;  
• the social builder: emphasises shared norms and values, but takes into account 
both stakeholder and societal interests in decision-making;  
• the boundaries setter: sets clear limits to prevent unethical behaviour, and 
enforces them fairly. 
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Heres’ work, part of the Integrity of Governance Research Group at the VU University 
Amsterdam (van den Akker et al. 2009), suggests that people typically look for a mix of all 
these traits when identifying what makes an effective ethical leader. 
 
Mulgan and Wanna (2011) argue that leadership alone is not enough, and that the 
establishment of a genuine culture of integrity is the responsibility of all members of an 
institution.  In essence, what is required is a collective and genuinely felt sense of identity 
with the moral purpose and vision of the organisation – something that is unlikely to be 
achieved by simply relying on rewarding good behaviour.  Our case studies in Bolivia and 
Rwanda provided some evidence to support this view. 
 
Both the Rwandan national government and the municipal government of La Paz in Bolivia 
appear to have had some success in their respective anti-corruption efforts.  Although the 
two examples represent different cultural contexts and different scales of government, the 
leadership in both cases shared a key feature in common: they were able to promote 
positive changes in the self-identity of public officials and also their relationships with 
citizens.  In both cases, these developments were driven by a strong political will to bring 
about change. 
 
In 2001, major storms precipitated large scale flood damage in La Paz, Bolivia, leaving many 
families homeless and some bereaved.  The municipal government lacked any emergency 
contingency plans and had limited economic resources; instead, it was forced to rely solely 
on its workforce to address the crisis.  The mayor of the city, Juan Del Granado, worked with 
public officials to offer desperately needed help in a very direct manner, transforming their 
identity from simply political agents to being seen as agents of public transformation.  The 
response to the disaster, and the appreciation of the public, helped restore the moral 
commitment of public officials, encouraging them to think in collective rather than 
individualistic terms.  Since then, being a public official and donning the yellow vest that 
identifies them on the streets, has become a source of pride.  Indeed, it has represented a 
complete change in the relationship between public officials and citizens, as well as in the 
self-understanding of their role and purpose (Zúñiga and Heywood 2015). 
 
In Rwanda, anti-corruption efforts have been built on two main pillars: the creation of a 
‘Rwandan identity’ in place of the ethnic identities of Tutsi and Hutu, which were banned in 
public spaces; and a reconnection with pre-colonial Rwanda, in a drive to recover traditional 
values and a ‘Rwandan way’.  To support these efforts, the government has introduced a 
comprehensive programme of education, based on the idealization of what Rwanda was 
before the colonial experience, and emphasising the negative associations of what 
corruption represents: lack of values, enemy of development and peace, lack of dignity, 
betrayal of the nation.  The aim has been to transform the self-image of Rwandans and to 
re-build the nation in such a way as to prevent any re-emergence of the divisions that had 
led to the country to genocide in 1994.  Both the La Paz and Rwanda examples also 
underline the importance of co-responsibility, ensuring that citizens feel an engagement in 
contributing to efforts to make things better. 
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Part 3: Conclusions 
 
Definitions / understanding integrity 
 
Corruption is often understood as the misuse of public office for private gain. The 
understanding of corruption as decay or a deviation from an ideal state has encouraged a 
focus on curbing corruption rather than on increasing integrity – on stopping negative 
behaviour rather than promoting positive behaviour. 
 
Integrity has a positive, proactive focus: it means more than just ‘not corrupt’, and involves 
doing the right thing in the right way. Yet lack of clarity about what integrity is has hindered 
attempts to promote it.  In particular, the relationship between personal integrity and role-
based integrity, as well as between integrity at the individual or at the institutional level, has 
resulted in confusion about the how the concept can be translated into practical action. 
 
Integrity thus entails complex relationships with other dimensions, and can be analysed 
from various perspectives.  For the purpose of developing an approach to integrity 
management (that is, the formal framework to ensure ethical behaviour by public officials), 
we distinguish core characteristics of personal and political integrity.   
 
The former entails: wholeness (thinking beyond just the personal); action that is consistent 
with principles (doing the right things); morality (doing things for the right reasons); and 
process (doing things in the right way).  The latter encompasses: normative justice; 
openness and transparency; citizen engagement; and impartial authorities. 
 
Integrity in a political context therefore involves continuous interaction between institutions 
of governance and citizens, and requires careful management of both decision-making and 
accountability structures. 
 
 
What works in promoting integrity? 
 
Institutional design to promote appropriate incentives and rule-compliance is not enough 
on its own to ensure integrity. Social norms and values are also important in influencing 
both individual behaviour and the effectiveness of institutions. 
 
The promotion of integrity requires formal tools, such as codes of conduct, advice 
mechanisms or opportunities for discussion between authorities and employees about 
delicate decisions. Professional standards related to specialist expertise (e.g. the Hippocratic 
Oath) provide another example: they help professionals resist corruption and pursue 
integrity. But promoting integrity also requires informal tools − such as committed 
leadership and an appropriate organisational culture − to create the environment needed 
for formal tools to be effective. These supportive informal factors include the following: 
 
• Transformational leadership can set an example for public servants and promote 
a sense of shared identity, purpose and responsibility. Such leadership also helps 
build an organisational culture of community, openness and mutual respect.  
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• Communication within an organisation − what is said, how and by whom − can 
contribute to a sense of community.  
• Continuity: Using a range of methods can also support continuity and reinforce 
messages. For example, our research found that Rwanda’s use of a range of 
channels for its education in values (formal education, the media and community 
structures as well as new programmes) contrasted with Bolivia’s narrower and 
sporadic initiatives. Rwanda’s more frequent interventions have achieved higher 
impact. 
 
Curbing corruption or increasing integrity? 
 
Regulation tends to emphasise either compliance (to prevent corruption) or values (to 
promote integrity): 
 
• A compliance-based system uses rules to reduce officials’ personal discretion, but 
can be time-consuming and expensive to implement. It implies low trust in public 
officials.  
• A values-based system promotes ethical standards − through codes of conduct, 
for example, or education − and its avoidance of such strict, detailed regulation 
can make it more cost-effective and efficient. Although it implies higher trust in 
public officials, and allows them discretion to adapt their actions to the specific 
contexts and situations they face, it is also more difficult to implement and to 
monitor 
State-level regulation involves some combination of both approaches, but recent 
developments have seen a greater emphasis placed on compliance mechanisms as a visible 
response to demands for action following corruption scandals. However, compliance 
approaches do not teach or instil integrity, nor do they prevent officials from finding ways of 
technically adhering to the rules while contravening their spirit.  
 
Compliance approaches may in fact undermine integrity and reduce people’s trust in public 
officials, and therefore reduce trust in the political system. This is because strict regulation 
does not give officials the opportunity to show integrity and so to earn public trust. Once 
such a pattern is begun, it is likely to become self-reinforcing: future policy is unlikely to 
provide such opportunities, and officials’ values-based motivation for probity is likely to 
decline. Over time, a compliance-based system may reinforce a move away from integrity. 
 
A mix of compliance and values approaches is therefore needed, and recent studies have 
confirmed that their interaction is important. Particularly in contexts where corruption is 
deep-rooted, compliance-based efforts alone are unlikely to be enough.  So how can the 
two approaches be used in ways that complement each other? 
 
Therefore, key consideration for policy-makers include the following: 
 
• Context: Adaptation to the particular context is of course important. For example, 
imposing a compliance-based system when a values-based system is already in 
place can do more harm than good.  Equally, expecting integrity-focused codes of 
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conduct to have any purchase in situations where corruption is deeply embedded 
is naïve. 
• Timing and sequencing: Part of attention to context is attention to timing. 
Different types of intervention may be needed at different times. Compliance-
based tools may be useful as a short-term crisis response – to lay a foundation 
for a more sustainable approach to promoting integrity. For example, our 
research considers how the mayor of La Paz, Bolivia used tough laws to crack 
down on corruption and send a strong message to officials, followed by long-term 
initiatives to promote integrity (1999-2010).  
• Diversity - a range of tools can reach a range of people: A range of tools is more 
likely to be effective, as different people will respond better to different 
approaches. For example, some people might adopt a code of ethics without 
further prompting; some might need guidance in how to apply principles; and 
some might disregard an ethical code and require laws and regulations. Likewise, 
using a range of communication methods is more likely to reach people who have 
different social backgrounds and levels of education. For example, we have seen 
how the Rwandan government is using informal and formal education strategies 
to promote what they argue are pre-colonial values. 
• Mutual reinforcement: A society’s rules and values need to reinforce each other.  
If rules are introduced to address concerns about corruption, these should be 
consistent with public understanding of appropriate and acceptable behaviour – 
so, for instance, in settings where local chiefs or leaders are expected to be 
providers, it may be counterproductive to impose rules that restrict their capacity 
to disburse favours without alternatives in place.  Likewise, efforts to tackle 
corruption and promote integrity need to be integrated into wider initiatives to 
deliver effective services. 
• Partnership of government and citizens: It is widely regarded as important to 
promote partnership between authorities and citizens working together towards 
shared goals.  Citizens should naturally believe in the good faith of authorities to 
implement promised reforms, which requires both transparency and that effective 
accountability measures to be in place.  However, the experience of La Paz in 
Bolivia suggests that even when such mechanisms are in place, citizens may be 
reluctant to use them.  Ultimately, leadership is the critical variable that drives 
genuine reform. 
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